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Abstract—While social media has been proved as an excep-
tionally useful tool to interact with other people and massively
and quickly spread helpful information, its great potential has
been ill-intentionally leveraged as well to distort political elec-
tions and manipulate constituents. In the paper at hand, we
analyzed the presence and behavior of social bots on Twitter
in the context of the November 2019 Spanish general election.
Throughout our study, we classified involved users as social bots
or humans, and examined their interactions from a quantitative
(i.e., amount of traffic generated and existing relations) and
qualitative (i.e., user’s political affinity and sentiment towards
the most important parties) perspectives. Results demonstrated
that a non-negligible amount of those bots actively participated
in the election, supporting each of the five principal political
parties.
Index Terms—Data mining and (big) data analysis, election
manipulation, fake news, machine learning, information technol-
ogy services, information visualization, political social bots
I. INTRODUCTION
Social media have become one of the main channels to
spread information worldwide at scale and their popularity
renders them as one of the most impactful means of influ-
encing public opinion [1], [2]. As stated by the 2019 Global
Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation report [3]
elaborated by the University of Oxford:
“Social media, which was once heralded as a force
for freedom and democracy, has come under increas-
ing scrutiny for its role in amplifying disinformation,
inciting violence, and lowering levels of trust in
media and democratic institutions.”
To this extent, one of the most powerful strategies to
maximize the dissemination of a message that aims to de-
ceive social media users consists on using social bots as
amplifiers [4]. Those software-controlled social accounts are
able to effectively mimic the normal behavior of human users
while sneakily operating at a much higher rate and remaining
obscure [5]. In particular, recent studies have disclosed how
these coordinated armies are working to poison democratic
elections in an orchestrated manner [6].
While social media enables the fast propagation of fake
news or any other misleading information over the web, the
so-called political social bots take care of amplifying their
popularity to catch the eye of virtual communities and to create
manually crafted viral trends [7].
They share a common characteristic: the abuse of automa-
tion tools to generate huge amounts of social media activity
in order to support, or oppositely attack, political figures
following their agenda with personal interests. Alarmingly,
bots are progressively becoming more sophisticated thanks
also to the advances in Artificial Intelligence [8]. Slowly, year
by year, bots can build more realistic social media behaviors
and produce credible content with human-like temporal pat-
terns [9], while creating a coordinated network to spread the
forged information further [10].
In this regard, social bots represent a growing phenomenon
(see Figure 1) which aims at jeopardizing modern democracies
by distorting reality and manipulating constituents [11]. These
malicious operations are often referred to as astroturfing
or Twitter bombs, which fake the appearance of organic
grassroot participation while being secretly orchestrated and
funded [12]. In such a scenario, it is clear that this threat is
more present and real than ever, potentially affecting millions
of users that are absolutely unaware of these malicious activ-
ities which may undermine worldwide democracies [13].
Growing tren
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Fig. 1: Recent political and administrative elections with social
bots participation.
Given the above-mentioned non-negligible threats and dan-
gers to our democracies and modern societies, there is an
imperative and urgent need to develop innovative solutions
to safeguard defenseless citizens from ill-intentioned manipu-
lation. In this sense, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) [14]
becomes a promising paradigm with which to perform an in-
depth analysis of publicly accessible sources, such as social
networks, and tackle social media manipulation.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
00
93
1v
2 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 12
 O
ct 
20
20
2One of the major challenges within this larger issue has
been to effectively model the behavior of these social bots.
This information can greatly help to improve the detection
methods and to better quantify the impact that these bots can
have on social events and real world decisions. To contribute
to address this challenge, in this work we perform an in-
depth case study of the activity and behavior of social bots on
Twitter in the context of the November 2019 Spanish general
election. More specifically, we have the following research
objectives: i) to quantify the presence and relationships of the
social bot accounts and analyze behavioral differences with
the human-controlled accounts; ii) to infer and analyze the
political party affinity of the social bots; iii) to analyze the
temporality of the social bot activity associating it with real
world events; and iv) to perform content sentiment analysis of
the tweets.
To accomplish these objectives, the paper at hand is struc-
tured as follows: i) Section II will provide both the political
context (Section II-A) and a review of the literature (Sec-
tion II-B); ii) Section III will provide the required information
regarding the followed methodology and the mathematical
background; iii) Section IV will present the results of the
analysis which are later commented in iv) the discussion
section (V); finally, v) Section VI will conclude and examine
potential research lines.
II. BACKGROUND
For the development and understanding of the case study it
is necessary to have a basic notion of the Spanish political con-
text, discussed in Section II-A. Meanwhile, we comment on
how this type of problems have been tackled in Section II-B.
A. Political Context
On November 10th, 2019, the Spanish general election was
held, where five dominant political parties (among several
others) participated, namely: United We Can (Unidas Pode-
mos, UP, left-wing to far-left), the Spanish Socialist Worker’s
Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espan˜ol, PSOE, centre-left),
Citizens (Ciudadanos, CS, centre to centre-right), the People’s
Party (Partido Popular, PP, centre-right to right-wing) and
VOX (VOX, right-wing to far-right).
Throughout the time window analyzed in this work, a
number of remarkable events should be highlighted:
• October 10th, 2019 – Santiago Abascal (VOX’s political
leader) participated in the live national TV show “El
Hormiguero”
• October 19-20th, 2019 – Riots in Catalonia
• October 24th, 2019 – Exhumation of Spanish fascist
dictator Francisco Franco
• November 4th, 2019 – Electoral debate on national TV
• November 10th, 2019 – General election day
Finally, Figure 2 reports the parliament composition as a
result of the general election, note that only the five main
parties are highlighted.
UP PSOE CS PP VOX
LEFT RIGHT
26 120 10 89 52
350
TOTAL SEATS
Parties Shares:
Fig. 2: Parliament composition and parties’ disposition after
the 2019 Spanish general election, focusing on the main five
political actors
.
B. Related Works
As already mentioned, social bots persist as a severe threat
against modern digital democracies, attracting the attention
of both academia and industry. Several researchers worldwide
studied such alarming phenomenon, aiming at shedding light
and proposing effective solutions.
To battle against the bots’ army, authors in [15] first
introduced Botometer (previously known as BotOrNot), the
de-facto standard in terms of bot identification in Twitter, as
detailed in Section III-C. By extracting a large collection of
data and meta-data of Twitter users, Botometer yields quite
high performance by achieving 0.85 Area Under the receiver
operating characteristic Curve (AUC) when tested on publicly-
available bot dataset. To increase its performance, authors
added manually-labeled accounts to spot more sophisticated
bots, thus reaching 0.95 AUC. Additionally, authors claimed
that the bot population in Twitter ranged between 9% and
15%, with different retweet and mention strategies when
interacting with human or other bots. Botometer has been
further refined in the last years, and recently a third version
has been released [7] featuring some improvements aiming at
balancing the bot score.
In [4], the authors compared the communication patterns
among Twitter users during riot events. In particular, they stud-
ied the emotional level of the messages, with a particular focus
on the direct messages generated by bot accounts. Remarkably,
bots convey emotions that are comparable to those conveyed
by human accounts. Such a strategy is indeed used by the bots
to remain unveiled and, thus, attract humans that are encour-
aged to interact with automatic-generated content. Similarly,
in [16], the relative importance and persistence of social bots
were analyzed during 3 crucial events, namely: 2016 US pres-
idential elections, the ongoing Ukrainian-Russian conflict, and
the Turkish censorship implemented by the government. More
specifically, the primary outcomes of the study showed that
bots attempted to initiate contact with users at an extremely
higher rate than human users. Through the application of social
network analysis centrality measurements, authors found out
that social bots, while representing less than 1% of the total
user population of the dataset, displayed an incredible level of
structural network influence, with bot influencers capable of
effortlessly captivating human ones.
3Related work Scenario Language Platform Recollectionperiod Bot Detection Bot presence Bot activity
Varol et al. [15] N.A. English Twitter 90 days Botometerthreshold = 0.5
1.2-2.1M
(9%-15%)
378M-630M
(9%-15%)
Kusen et al. [4] 2017-18 Riot Events English, German Twitter 44 days Botometerthreshold = 0.6
9,548
(0.56%) N.A.
Schuchard et
al. [16] 2016 Global Events
English, Turkish,
Ukrainian,
Russian
Twitter 84 days DeBot 14,386(0.29%) 3.46M (12%)
Ferrara [8] 2016-17-18 PoliticalEvents English, French Twitter 92 days
Botometer
threshold = 0.5,
simplified
Botometer
1M (18%) 6.525M (16%)
Cresci et al [17]
2012 IT Political
Events, 2011
Spambots
English, Italian Twitter N.A. AdversarialApproach N.A. N.A.
Pozzana,
Ferrara [18]
2017 FR Presidential,
2011 Spambots
English, French,
Italian Twitter 14 days
Botometer
threshold = 0.53,
Hand Labeled
2M (18%),
5,000
(58.8%)
3.4M
(21.25%),
11.8M (28.8%)
Luceri et al. [19] 2016 US Presidential English, Russian Twitter N.A. IRL, HandLabeled
1,148
(0.09%) 1.2M (8.8%)
Our
contribution 2019 ES General Spanish Twitter 41 days
Botometer
threshold = 0.69,
Hand Labeled
40,098 (5%) 178,502 (3%)
TABLE I: Comparative table of the analyzed related works
Alarmingly, the social bots activity emphasizes its effec-
tiveness during the political election campaigns, trying to
deceive worldwide citizens toward forged viral trends. In [8],
an overview of the bots’ activities during crucial political
elections (i.e., 2016 US presidential, 2017 French presidential,
and 2018 US midterm) is presented, highlighting on some
significant peculiarities. More specifically, the author uncov-
ered massive participation of such accounts, which showed
human-like behavior while performing social interactions, and,
dangerously, the capability of adapting themselves to remain
obscure to the Twitter detection modules. As suggested in
other relevant articles, the author claimed that a black-market
for political bots might exist. Recently, sophisticated detection
methodologies have been proposed to win this arm race
against the bot collusion as an ultimate goal. In particular,
in [17], authors proposed an adversarial approach to detect
evolving bots. To this extent, authors synthetically modify
existing bots leveraging genetic algorithm, and demonstrated
the effectiveness of their proposal. Nonetheless, one could
argue that the generality of such detection methodology is
questionable due to the crafted nature of the algorithmically
generated bots. Moreover, authors in [18] proposed a bot
detection methodology based on the activities of the social
account in Twitter. In particular, they used the concept of user
session, referring to a time windows of social network posting.
Specifically, the sessions analysis showed behavioral trends in
humans that are absent in bots, mainly due to the automated
nature of their social activity. Furthermore, an approach based
on Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) aiming at capturing
bot behavior and thus identify bot accounts was presented
in [19]. By leveraging 2016 US presidential election data,
authors were capable of correctly classifying the majority of
social bots by relying on the flow of online activity within
the social platform. However, it is realistic to claim that more
perspectives need to be considered in order to defeat the bots’
army, such as the social network structure and the posted
content, just to cite some examples.
Table I gives a snapshot of the analyzed related works. In
particular, it is worth noticing that the entire set of works
investigating the bots’ labor leveraging a specific platform
(i.e., Twitter), even though recent researches suggest the pos-
sibility of extending the investigation to other platforms [20].
Moreover, the presence and activity of the bots substantially
vary depending on the proposed scenario and the employed
detection tool. Interestingly, only authors in [16] employed
DeBot as bot detection tool, arguing that it represents a valid
alternative to Botometer.
On the subject of political and opinion mining, users are
more likely to be exposed to online content that is ideologi-
cally closer to their political views (i.e., the echo chamber) due
to both the social media algorithms and the users’ tendency
to form links with like-minded people (i.e., homophily) [1],
[21], [22]. In this context, it has been proved that users do not
form links with the opposite political side; however, they tend
to mention them more often [1]. Previous results show how
different political ideologies can be distinguished by analyzing
the sentiment score towards determined subjects [23], even
though these aspect-based studies assume a known target [24].
To the best of our knowledge, none of the presented research
works performed an in-depth analysis of the 2019 Spanish
general election. Specifically, we believe that an effort is
more than necessary to clarify further the role of those forged
accounts in a crucial scenario for the European geopolitical
scene. To this extend, this paper contributes to the human-bot
arm race by proposing a novel framework which combines the
capabilities of bot supervised and unsupervised learning tech-
niques, together with a valuable features model. Additionally,
by studying the social interaction and the sentiment of the
posted content, an approach to correlate the bot accounts to
five main Spanish political parties is proposed, employing also
the manual annotation of several accounts, as we will see in
the next Sections.
4III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This section illustrates the steps followed during the de-
velopment of the research work. In short, this methodology
is a natural evolution of the Big Data Mining for Social
Bot Identification (BASTION) framework defined in [25] for
social bots identification. It also evolves towards an OSINT
perspective, integrating the stages defined in [14] for the
acquisition of open-source information. Figure 3 shows the
followed methodology in this article, defining the modules.
As observed in the figure, the framework is composed
of three main components. Specifically, the Data Collection
component focuses on the acquisition of Twitter interactions
using the Social Feed Manager’s crawler and harvester [26].
In turn, collected data goes directly to the Data Analysis
component, in which the modules pick relevant features and
elicit the users’ identification tokens. The resulting data are
stored in the Augmented Dataset for further uses. The core
of the framework is the Knowledge Extraction component.
In here, two machine learning pipelines subsequently attempt
to identify and extract information from the collected data.
To be more precise, firstly, a supervised ensemble algorithm
classifies the Twitter accounts as either humans or bots and,
secondly, a series of unsupervised techniques aim to discover
correlations between the bots.
A. Data Collection
During the initial Information Discovery, we used a list
of hashtags to collect tweets related to the Spanish general
election. On the one hand, we initially established as hashtags
in the list: the official name of the five main political parties,
the associated abbreviation of the name (if existed), and
their slogan of the campaign. On the other hand, along with
the monitoring window, the authors paid attention to Twitter
contents, searching for unpredictably trending topics related
to the daily political reality. Consequently, the initial list
was enriched with other hashtags regarding media scandals,
conflicting situations, and important political events. Among
others, authors compiled hashtags related to the visit of the
political leader Abascal to the TV program “El Hormiguero”,
the riots in Catalonia, the exhumation of the fascist dictator
Francisco Franco, the electoral debate, or the electoral pro-
cess. The complete list, finally composed by 46 hashtags, is
available in the research work’s official repository [27]. Notice
that we only collected tweets containing at least one of these
hashtags.
To gather the relevant content, we deployed the Social Feed
Manager (SFM) platform that continuously queried the Twitter
API to accumulate the tweets (both original, retweets, replies,
and quotes) containing at least one keyword within the sets
mentioned above. The collection started on October 4th, 2019,
and concluded on November 11th, 2019. During the collection
window, the harvester collected around six million tweets and
almost a million unique users. Despite the considerable size of
the harvested data, we cannot guarantee its completeness due
to limitations of the Twitter’s standard search APIs. Aiming
at reducing this potential gap, we recursively added all those
tweets (within the observation period) that were referenced by
the collected ones.The collected data is available at [28] and
explained in a published data descriptor article [29].
To better deal with the unstructured tweet data and to
circumvent the relatively fixed structure of the SFM database
technology, we exported the data to a non-relational MongoDB
instance. We have chosen the use of MongoDB instead of
complete Big Data frameworks because our volume of data
is moderate, and so these solutions would generate an un-
necessary increase of the complexity of our solution. At the
end of the Data Collection phase, the framework had two
complementary collections of data, namely the tweets (T) and
the users (U). To be precise:
• The tweets’ collection T stored a JSON document for
each tweet containing all the objects provided by the
Twitter APIs, e.g., the unique identifier of the tweet, its
text or the author, among others. For a full list, see both
Twitter API and SFM documentation [26].
• The users’ collection U stored the set of unique users
collected while crawling the tweets’ collection.
Throughout the following sections, we will refer to the
records in these collections as named tuples and access their
fields using the superscript notation. Furthermore, we will use
bold t ∈ T and u ∈ U to indicate any tweet t or user u, respec-
tively. For example, tuid and uuid indicate the unique identifier
of the tweet and the user, while ttext, ttimestamp and ttype refer to
the tweet’s text, timestamp and tweet type, respectively, where
ttype ∈ Π = {original, retweet, reply,quote}.
B. Data Analysis
The Data Analysis component takes care of transforming
the raw data obtained by the Twitter API, publicly available
at [28], into a usable format to power the machine learn-
ing pipelines. This component retrieves the full data from
the harvester and, after an anonymization layer, outputs the
Augmented Dataset that will be used in the analysis.
Unveiling it, this component hosts both the feature extrac-
tion and the anonymization processes. Concerning the former,
human analysts are in charge of analyzing the information
retrieved from the social media and of discovering, through
careful literature review, which features are required by the
analysis.
Considering our Augmented Dataset, the first and foremost
augmented feature used by the framework is the tweet’s
sentiment score. That is, a machine learning classifier predicts
a score for each tweets’ text, obtaining a value ranging
from zero (extremely negative) to one (extremely positive),
i.e., tsent ∈ [0, 1]. To be precise, the tweet’s text also passes
through a method that makes the text easier to understand
(e.g., removes special characters and converts emoji to text).
Retweets in particular will have the same sentiment score as
the original tweet.
The second augmented feature used by the framework is the
tweet’s topic mention. The information and Feature Discovery
phases picked up five different groups of keywords (WΓ) that
contained those trending topics which emerged on Twitter
during the five political events highlighted in Section II-A,
namely: i) AbascalEH, ii) Catalonia, iii) exhumation, iv)
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Fig. 3: Research methodology adopted for social bots identification and profiling.
debate and v) election. The Feature Model determines, for
each bag-of-word WΓ, whether at least one of the contained
keywords matches in the tweet’s text (or original text in case
of retweets).
Similarly to the previous group of features, the frame-
work extracts whether the tweets are mentioning any political
party. To be precise, the information and discovery phases
identified five groups of keywords (WP , where P ∈ P =
{UP,PSOE,CS,PP,VOX}) that refer to the five major po-
litical parties in Spain. However, rather than having a generic
match with these bag-of-words, these mentions to the political
parties are considered exclusive. Formally, each text is labeled
in a one-hot-encoding-like style, i.e., a tweet labeled as PP
only features at least one mention to the People’s Party and,
in the text, there is not any match with any keyword included
in another political parties’ bag-of-word. The same applies for
the retweets.
Moreover, the framework extracts all the relations between
any two users. In other words, we cave the intersections
between any given user’s followers and followings lists and
the whole list of harvested ones. Formally, let Fe and Fi
be the followers and followings lists of the user u provided
by the Twitter’s API. Then, we define ufwe = Fe ∩ U and
ufwi = Fi ∩ U as the user’s followers and followings lists
respectively.
Finally, the resulting feature set is released from any ref-
erence to the original tweets; moreover, each tweet’s unique
identifier is replaced with a randomly generated universal
unique identifier (UUID). These changes are performed auto-
matically, and the map between the tweets’ identifiers and the
newly generated UUIDs has not been saved to guarantee the
unique directionality of the transformation. Note that UUIDs
do not replace the users’ identifiers at this point.
After the Data Collection and Analysis stages, it was also
needed to process the data to acquire useful information about
all the accounts identified, being able to classify them as bots
or humans, to identify the political inclination of the detected
bots, and to identify relationships between bots.
C. Knowledge Extraction - Supervised Learning
1) Human-Bot Classifier: To detect the presence of social
bots within the dataset, we used Botometer, the de-facto
standard in terms of bot identification in Twitter [7]. This
framework, developed at Indiana University, consists of a
machine learning platform that extracts and analyzes more
than 1200 features spanning from content-related information,
user profile data, and sentiment analysis to produce a score
suggesting the likelihood that the account is indeed a social
bot. Botometer is publicly available through RapidAPI.
Among the several scores provided by the tool, theoretical
analysis and experimental results showed that the most suitable
one is the Universal Score us ∈ [0, 1], as described in [7]. It
rates any account according to the likelihood of being a bot,
i.e., scores close to 0 indicate that the users are extremely
likely to be real-user accounts, while scores nearby 1 show
that the accounts are behaving like social bots.
To be as conservative as possible, the Human-Bot Classifier
of our proposed framework (see Figure 4) only considers the
two ends of the universal score’s scale for classification. That
is to say, once we obtained the universal score distribution for
the Augmented Dataset, a statistical approach was used to label
the accounts. Formally, we identified with the 75th percentile
(p75 ∈ [0, 1]) and 95th percentile (p95 ∈ [0, 1]) the boundaries
for the human-like and the bot-like classes (establishing a
percentile of the 95th is common in the social sciences for
statistical significance or detection of outliers [30]). That is to
say, we considered as human (h ∈ H ⊆ U) those users u with
us < p75 and bots (b ∈ B ⊆ U) those users u with us > p95,
labeling all the users in between as unclear. In our sample,
with p75 = 0.236 and p95 = 0.691, we labeled approximately
593,000 accounts as humans, 145,000 as unclear and 40,000
accounts as social bots.
Finally, the module takes care of saving this information
in the dataset and, at last, anonymizes the users’ identifier,
converting them into randomly generated UUIDs.
2) Political Inclination classifier: In order to be able to
solve the attribution problem, as described in [25], the frame-
work includes a political affiliation classifier that aims to
sort the social bots according to their political behavior. As
reported in [23], [31], [32], natural language processing (NLP)
has been proved effective in analyzing the political character-
istics of Twitter users. Thus, the Political Inclination classifier
makes use of the average sentiment score for each group
of political party’s keywords (WP ). The required overhead
requested by any publicly available opinion mining framework
has been deemed not effective nor necessary. To be more
precise, since the data sources narrow subset of the whole
population (as reported in the previous sections), classical
6Fig. 4: Users’ bot score histogram, with cumulative distribution and percentiles.
solutions based on a plethora of dimensions do not work due
to the lack of suitable data. In other words, the social bots’
profiles have been analyzed only in regards to the specific
political keywords identified, thus they do not present any
content suitable for a more generic topic-based analysis.
Formally, the sentiment score su,τ,P ∈ [0, 1] for a given
user u, a tweet type τ ∈ Π and a political party P ∈ P is
computed as follows:
su,τ,P = mean(tsent ∈ [0, 1] | tuid = uuid
∧ ttype = τ
∧ ∃ w ∈WP . w ⊆ ttext
∧ ∀ P ′ 6= P . ∀ w′ ⊆WP’ . w′ * ttext)
(1)
It is noteworthy that, in order to calculate su,τ,P , we only
consider those tweets mentioning a single political party P ,
that is to say, a tweet citing two or more parties is excluded
to avoid user’s opinion misinterpretation [24]. Moreover, such
sentiment su,τ,P is divided according to the tweet type τ to
remark the differences in the type of interaction.
Furthermore, for each one of the identified subjects WΓ, this
module extracts the average sentiment score depending on both
the user, the tweet type, and the mentioned political party. In
the same way as the previous equation, tweets with multiple
political parties’ mentions are not included in the analysis.
However, this condition does not apply to the subject mentions,
that is to say, a tweet is considered if it includes at least, but
not limited to, one keyword of that subject. Thus, formally,
given a user u, a tweet type τ ∈ Π, a political party P ∈ P,
and a subject γ ∈ Γ, the sentiment score su,τ,P,γ ∈ [0, 1] is
computed as follows:
su,τ,P,γ = mean(tsent ∈ [0, 1] | tuid = uuid
∧ ttype = τ
∧ ∃ w ∈WP . w ⊆ ttext
∧ ∀ P ′ 6= P . ∀ w′ ⊆WP’. w′ * ttext
∧ ∃ q ∈Wγ . q ⊆ ttext)
(2)
Thus, combining the equations mentioned above, we obtain
a feature vector xu for each user u that includes both the
average sentiment score towards any given political party
su,τ,P and toward any subject thematic in combination with
any political party su,τ,P,γ . Formally:
xu =
{
su,τ,P | ∀ τ ∈ Π . ∀ P ∈ P
}
∪ {su,τ,P,γ | ∀ τ ∈ Π . ∀ P ∈ P . ∀ γ ∈ Γ} (3)
Regarding the training and testing dataset used for building
the machine learning classifier, a total of 1,000 among the
leading and most important verified politicians have been man-
ually labeled with their political party [21]. Those accounts
were either verified by Twitter or explicitly mentioned the
affiliation with a political party in their name or description.
Such handcrafted subset of users, intentionally balanced with
200 politicians per political party, provided the training sample
of the classifier (X).
As we did not have specific requirements for adopting a
certain kind of classification algorithms, we selected six of
the most common ones to perform the analysis, namely:
• Random Forest (f1 = rf(X)) – 10 trees, with minimum
leaf size of 5
• Multilayer perceptron - NN (f2 = nn(X)) – with a
single hidden layer, 100 nodes, ReLu activation function,
Adam solver with α = 0.001, and 200 replicable training
interactions
• Support Vector Machine - SVM (f3 = svm(X)) – C =
1.0,  = 0.1 with RBF kernel, and 100 interaction limits
with 0.001 numerical tollerance
• Naive Bayes (f4 = nb(X))
• k-Nearest Neighbor - kNN (f5 = knn(X)) – with 5
neighbors, euclidean metric, and uniform weights
• AdaBoost (with internal tree) (f6 = ab(X)) – with 50
estimators, SAMME.R classification algorithm and linear
regression loss function
The evaluation of the algorithms has been carried out with a
10-fold cross validation whose results are available in Table II.
We indicate with f(x) = [yˆ, p(yˆ)] the result of applying a
classifier f to any given feature vector x, resulting in a set
of predicted classes yˆ with their relative probability p(yˆ). It
holds that the probability of any given class y’ is given by
f(x)[y’] = p(y’). If the evaluated user has a manually verified
label, this will be indicated with y.
Given the high scores achieved by all the algorithms, we
decided to combine their predictions (weighted accordingly)
to label the social bot accounts. Formally, for a party P ∈ P
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Model Accuracy Precision Recall F1 AUC
RF 0.962 0.963 0.962 0.962 0.995
NN 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.993
SVM 0.932 0.934 0.932 0.932 0.991
NB 0.962 0.963 0.962 0.962 0.998
kNN 0.940 0.943 0.940 0.940 0.977
AB 0.954 0.955 0.954 0.954 0.994
TABLE II: Evaluation of the trained classifiers with a manually
labeled sample.
and a user u with feature vector xu, the probability of being
associated to that political party, u 7→ P , is expressed as:
p(u 7→ P ) = mean
∀ f∈F
(
f(xu)[P ]
)
(4)
In other words, the probability of the predicted label is
assigned by averaging the probability assigned by each al-
gorithm. We map an account with a political party if and only
if p(u 7→ P ) > δ, where δ ∈ [0, 1] represents a threshold
defined as:
δ = 1− 1|P| = 0.8 (5)
However, if the predicted probability for a single party is
lower than δ, then we consider the cumulative sum of the
two parties with the highest probability. For example, consider
a bot b ∈ B that has p(b 7→ PSOE) = 0.5 and p(b 7→
UP) = 0.45. Individually, neither PSOE nor UP reach a good
enough confidence to justify the classification. However, when
considered together:
p(b 7→ {PSOE,UP}) = p(b 7→ PSOE)+p(b 7→ UP) = 0.95
Then, their cumulative sum is greater than the threshold, hence
the predicted class “PSOE-UP” can be accepted.
Finally, we reject the predicted class for any bot for which it
is not possible to predict a class with confidence score higher
than δ.
D. Knowledge Extraction - Unsupervised Learning
The mission of the unsupervised machine learning compo-
nent is to help identify, in a visual way, groups of social bots
by analyzing their properties as a social group. Indeed, one
of the most critical challenges [25] resides in the visualization
of these large graphs. This research makes use of the Gephi
software to generate an undirected graph containing the friend-
ship relations between the studied set of bots. In particular,
each node of the graph represents a unique user, while the
edges (or connections) between nodes are constructed using
the followers (ufwe) and followings (ufwi) lists of these users.
More specifically, two nodes will be connected if there is a
follower or following relationship between them.
We apply Gephi’s ForceAtlas2 algorithm to construct the
graph layout [33]. This algorithm constantly iterates until
stopped, dynamically repulsing or attracting the nodes in a
network based on the current state of the graph and a number
of input parameters. Additionally, we have computed the
closeness centrality of each node and used it to codify its
size, where those nodes with a higher centrality will present a
larger size. Finally, we keep only the giant component of the
network, thus removing small and isolated sub-components of
the network.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
This section introduces the experiments and the results
obtained by analyzing the 2019 Spanish general election.
All these experiments were conducted in a dedicated server
featuring 2 Intel Xeon E5-2630 v4 CPUs (a total of 20 cores
at 2.2 GHz) and 80 GB of DDR4 memory at 2400 MHz. The
whole project occupies around 115 GB of storage.
A. Statistical information
This section presents some descriptive statistics regarding
the dataset size and composition.
Tweet Type Amount Proportion User’s AVG
Retweet 5,116,265 87.81% 7.13
Original 593,794 10.19% 3.75
Reply 66,032 1.13% 3.23
Quote 50,564 0.87% 2.33
Total 5,826,655 100% -
TABLE III: Tweet types distributions of collected tweets.
Firstly, Table III reports the overall amounts of collected
tweets according to their type. That is to say, over the
5, 826, 655 tweets collected, the vast majority (87.81%) are
retweets, followed by originals (10.19%), replies (1.13%), and
quotes (0.87%). The table also includes the average (AVG)
number of interactions per user.
Secondly, from the tweets we extrapolated the set of users
(783, 185 unique accounts to be precise) as indicated in
Table IV; however, a number of accounts (0.68%) have been
excluded a-priori either because they had been removed,
they had no tweets, or they had a private profile. As firstly
8User Group Amount Proportion AVG Tweets
Removed 5,322 0.68% -
Humans 592,909 75.70% 7.36
Uncertain 144,856 18.50% -
Social bots 40,098 5.12% 4.45
Total 783,185 100% -
TABLE IV: Collected users’ groups distributions.
illustrated in Figure 4 and then presented in Table IV, a total
of 592, 909 have been classified as Humans (i.e., us < p75),
144, 856 as Uncertain (i.e., p75 ≤ us < p95), and 40, 098 as
Bots (i.e., us ≥ p95). To reduce the bias in our investigations,
the Uncertain group has been discarded.
Users’ Class Tweet Type Amount Proportion User’s AVG
Humans
Retweet 3,756,324 86.29% 6.89
Original 497,814 11.44% 3.84
Reply 55,116 1.27% 3.28
Quote 43,553 1.00% 2.30
Subtotal 4,352,857 100% 6.20
Social bots
Retweet 164,927 92.40% 4.58
Original 12,444 6.97% 2.30
Reply 659 0.37% 1.81
Quote 472 0.26% 1.95
Subtotal 178,502 100% 4.45
TABLE V: Distribution of tweets per category.
Thirdly, as shown in Figure 5, the collected tweets are not
uniformly distributed across the observation period. In the
figure, we highlighted several significant political events that
are associated with these traffic spikes.
Finally, the traffic volumes, their relative proportions, and
the average number of interactions per user are presented in
Table V according to both the users’ class and the tweet types.
(a) Distributions for those accounts classified as humans.
(b) Distributions for those accounts classified as social bots.
Fig. 6: Number of accounts having a certain amount of
interactions, grouped according to the tweet types.
In addition to these high-level metrics, we analyzed the
distributions of the users according to their generated traffic
volumes. In other words, Figure 6 illustrates the number of
users as a function of their number of generated interactions
for those accounts classified as humans H (Figure 6a) and so-
cial bots B (Figure 6b). To improve the figure’s readability, the
vertical axes feature a logarithmic scale while the horizontal
ones are capped both for humans and social bots.
As shown in both Figure 6a and Figure 6b, the interac-
tions’ volumes do not present a uniform distribution; on the
contrary, the vast majority of the users (both human and social
bots) have published just a few tweets. Interestingly enough,
all tweet types present both similar shares and distributions
(although scaled), as numerically reported in Table V.
B. Behavioral differences between humans and social bots
One of the main questions raised by this research is to mea-
sure the effectiveness of social bots. A first attempt includes
the analysis of the interactions for those tweets that have a
direct and unique target, i.e., retweets, replies and quotes.
These tweet types indicate that a user is actively interacting
with a target on different degrees. For example, a user might
retweet content because of the target’s idea, or comment on it
(either reply or quote) due to shared interests or concerns.
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Fig. 7: Interactions involving bots and users by tweet type.
In this context, we denote as “active user” the person
who creates the interaction whereas “passive user” is the
owner of the retweeted, replied, or quoted tweet. Following
this convention, Figure 7 presents the volumes of shared
tweets according to both the tweet type (i.e., retweets, replies
or quotes) and the users’ classification. Note that: i) the
volumes are presented in their logarithmic form to increase
the separability of the smaller categories, and, ii) this section
only considers those tweets where both the active and the
passive users are in the humans or the social bots groups;
in other words, tweets starting or targeting an account in the
Uncertain group (i.e., p75 ≤ us < p95) have been excluded
(around 1, 253, 955 tweets).
Nevertheless, and as expected, the single most common
type of interaction is the retweet, providing alone more than
87% of the interactions. Considering the whole scenario,
5% of the traffic volumes involve a social bot either as an
active or passive actor. However, if we exclude the human-to-
human retweets, the reader might notice that this proportion
skyrockets to an overwhelming 66.4%.
On the one hand, a different picture is depicted by looking
deeper into the human’s interactions other than the human-
to-human retweets. Notably, only 37% of these interactions
9are targeting social bots, of which 95% are retweets. In other
words, humans tend to retweet the content shared by the social
bots instead of quoting or replying to them. On the other hand,
only 2% of social bots activities are targeting other social bots.
In particular, social bots tend to retweet human contents in
an attempt to make it viral [25]: according to our data, and
if we exclude human-to-human retweets, almost half of the
generated traffic (45%) is provided by social bots retweeting
humans’ contents.
C. Political party affinity
This section focuses on the analysis of the contents shared
by the social bots in an attempt to solve the attribution problem
identified in [25]. To do so, only those social bots b that have
at least one tweet specifically targeting a political party P are
considered. In this sense, of the nearly forty thousand social
bots identified in Table IV, only 20, 364 qualifies (50.79%),
for a total of 104, 989 tweets (58.82%).
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Fig. 8: Number of social bots according to their predicted
political party.
Figure 8 reports the results of the ensemble classifier
described in Section IV-C. In the figure, the vertical axis
represents the first political party identified by the classifier,
while the horizontal presents the second one identified. It
follows that the diagonal cells represent those social bots that
have been classified as mapped to a single political party. In
the figure, those social bots that have not been classified with
sufficient enough confidence are labeled as “Unknown”.
Classification results of those social bots aligned with only a
single party are graphically represented in Figure 9 in conjunc-
tion with manually labeled users. To be precise, the figure is
the result of a manually-driven dimensionality reduction to five
dimensions projected into a plane. Each dimension constitutes
the average user’s sentiment towards a political party.
From now on, and for the sake of simplicity, we will focus
the rest of the analysis on the social bots associated with only
one political party.
D. On the subject of social bots, followers, and followings
The groups of social bots identified so far may have several
common traits and could implant a coordinated behavior. Al-
though the study of the existence of potential botnets remains
Style
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Fig. 9: Bi-dimensional projection of social bots’ single polit-
ical affinities and manually labeled users.
as future work, it is worthy to show certain relationships
between the social bots. As social media like Twitter features
direct connections between the users in terms of followers and
followings, it is specially interesting to place the social bots
in a social graph.
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Fig. 10: Friendship relationship among bots.
Figure 10 presents the undirected social graph formed by
the classified social bots. Each node is a social bot whereas
each edge represents an undirected link between two social
bots due to a following or a follower relation.
The algorithm used to build the graph is based on network
metrics such as the average degree and the centrality values
of the social relationships. It places very close those nodes
that are very connected to each other, and moves away those
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Fig. 11: Active social bots with one-party affinity (cumulative and per day basis).
others with which fewer relationships are shared. As a result,
some differentiated clusters arise, where bigger nodes indicate
a higher centrality measure of the account, i.e., social hubs.
Surprisingly, the resulting clusters are mostly composed
by social bots that share political affinity. In other words,
the groups of bots identified by the political classifier in
Section IV-C are indeed so socially interconnected. In combi-
nation with the quantitative measures reported in the previous
sections, Figure 10 further suggests a coordinated effort to
deploy, maintain, and employ social bots.
E. The temporal appearance of social bots
The presence of social bots on Twitter on the eve of the 2019
Spanish general election was not random. According to our
data, a direct correlation manifests between their appearance,
the spikes in the traffic volumes, and the major political events.
To begin with Figure 11, it illustrates the daily appearance of
new social bots. On the horizontal axis we have the dates in the
observation period, while, on the vertical one, we observe the
number of detected social bots. There are two complementary
groups of time series in Figure 11. The time series represented
by the lines reports the cumulative number of unique social
bots, while the histogram ones illustrate the daily activity per
political party.
From the figure, it is possible to notice that the increase in
the numbers of the social armies was constant throughout the
whole electoral season. Notably, more than 500 bots (exposing
an affinity with VOX) emerged on the same day as VOX’s
leader participated in the national TV show “El Hormiguero”.
Concerning the dates when the riots in Catalonia occurred, our
data do not include any significant increase in the number of
social bots. However, we did detect a sizable spike during the
controversial act of Franco’s exhumation.
Notably, during the ten days before the election day, more
than five thousand new social bots popped up, mainly during
the night of the electoral debate and the election day. During
this specific time window, two different patterns appear. On
one side, the social bots associated with the PP, PSOE, and
VOX parties presented essentially the same growing trend,
while those bound to both UP and Cs depict a remarkable
increment. One might infer that those fake accounts were
precisely hired to support the final events of the campaign.
Although correlation does not imply causality, it is difficult
not to suspect that the social bots were driven by actors who
followed, monitored, and participated in the Spanish political
life. The following sections will attempt to corroborate this
hypothesis by looking at the behavior of these social armies.
F. Timeline of the social bots’ interactions
The daily increase in the number of social armies in
principle does not imply their effectiveness. While, on the one
hand, Section IV-B presented the humans-bots interactions, on
the other hand, Figure 12 shows their temporal properties.
To be more precise, Figure 12a reports, according to the
political party, the number of generated original tweets, quotes
and replies created by social bots. As mentioned in the
previous sections, all the anomalies in the traffic volumes’
patterns are correlated to major political events. As for the
retweets, we devote two complementary figures. Figure 12b
quantifies the total retweets caused by the social bots contents,
whereas Figure 12c reports the volumes of the actual retweets
shared directly by the social bots.
In other words, Figure 12b presents the total volume of
tweets that retweeted social bots original tweets, quotes and
replies. Note that the overall numbers are in the orders of tens
of thousands of retweets. By looking at Figure 12b, it appears
that the social bots allegedly connected to VOX promote
contents that are attractive enough to be shared and propagated
by other users. Oddly enough, the tweets originated from
social bots affiliated with the PP obtained several thousand
retweets on three separate occasions, namely during the riots
in Catalonia, during the exhumation of the Spanish fascist
dictator Francisco Franco, and in the days before the national
debate. Ostensibly, these social bots shared contents aligned
with the political agenda of PP.
Finally, in Figure 12c, it appears that, apart from a few
precise exceptions, the amount of retweets during the observa-
tion period is consistently below a thousand tweets per group.
Besides this steady behavior, further research is required to
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Fig. 12: Activity of social bots with one-party affinity.
analyze these retweeting strategies and their interactions with
other parties.
G. Tweets’ contents analysis
The social bots aspects discussed so far are mostly measures
of the account’s properties. However, the correlation between
their actions and the subjects and ideas promoted is also of
great importance.
In this regard, Figure 13 reports the sentiment analysis of
each group of social bots in comparison with the manually
labeled sample of verified human users. The boxplots in the
figure show the distribution of the sentiment score of the tweets
toward each political party, i.e., their attitude concerning the
alliances. Both humans (in Figure 13a) and social bots (in
Figure 13b) are divided according to their assigned political
party. Scores neighboring zero indicate an antagonistic opin-
ion, while a score close to one suggests an appraisal for the
subject.
Although the overall perspective around the parties is neg-
ative (global averages are below 0.2), each group presents a
reasonable change regarding their corresponding party. The
political scenario surrounding the Spanish general election
might justify the anomalies for some specific combinations.
For example, in Figure 13a, the manually verified humans
representing the PSOE were substantially pushing more sup-
portive content towards the UP than their own party.
As for the social bots of Figure 13b, the panorama looks
appreciably different. As stated before, despite the negatively-
oriented sentiment scores that characterize the political discus-
sion, it seems that the ensemble classifier managed to separate
the social bots accordingly to the supported political party.
H. Overview of social bots’ behavior findings
On the basis of the results obtained, we can extract up-to-
date insights of social bot behavioral patterns. In the following,
we discuss the lessons learned about the properties of the
monitored social bots in the context of our study:
1) Social bots had a fixation on targeting major national
events. Our bot activity analysis suggests that social
12
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Fig. 13: Sentiment of labeled users and social bots against party themes.
bots were aware of the mainstream events and sensible
to trending topics. Analyzing the data of these specific
situations could have an added value in detecting and
monitoring social bots.
2) Social bots tended to retweet human content. In terms of
traffic generated, social bots specifically viralized legiti-
mate tweets rather than supporting each other or replying
to other users. Even though we cannot give a founded
explanation with the obtained results, we understand that
the retweet is an extremely informative interaction for
profiling social bots.
3) Social bots had no affinity for a single political party, but
shared more than one ideology. From the 20,364 profiled
social bots, we are only able to classify the 38% within a
unique political inclination, whereas the rest were aligned
with two political parties (23%) or more (39%). Current
social bots may be acting under more complex dynamics
than supporting a single group.
4) Social bots with the same ideology were highly socially
connected. The social graph shows that groups with the
same political affinity also formed robust clusters of
friendship connections on Twitter. Therefore, the position
of the nodes (users) in such networks could facilitate the
detection of suspicious accounts due to the proximity to
clusters of bots already recognized.
5) Social bots opted for conflict and disrepute rather than
support. The sentiment analysis demonstrates that social
bot interactions were specially negative against political
parties opposed to the inferred ideology. With this in
mind, perhaps more consideration needs to be given to
who the social bots are acting against rather who they are
supporting.
These key findings may be potentially valuable in current
real-world applications, specifically, to enhance today’s bot
detection mechanisms. The translation of these facts into
state-of-the-art methodologies and low-level machine learning
features may enable the construction of more precise systems
which are able to adapt and improve themselves following the
latest trends of social bot behaviors.
V. DISCUSSION
First, we would like to map the results and data that we
observe with the Spanish political context at the time. This
election took place due to a previous failed attempt where there
was no majority in the parliament, and the PSOE leader did
not accomplish to receive support from the rest of the parties to
become Prime Minister. Hence, during the pre-electoral period,
the political parties were aware of the inevitable necessity to
find alliances in other parties as an absolute majority was
unlikely to be reached with just the citizens’ voting. Figure 13
showed that the overall sentiment trend in our data sample is
negative, and this is aligned with the trend in many social
networks and communities, where trolling and hate speech
are the norm [34]; however, we did report some differences in
terms of sentiments as part of the interactions between some
parties. For example, in Figure 13a we see a positive sentiment
score of PSOE towards UP, and not in vain, the outcome of
this election was a coalition government between these two
parties. Interestingly enough, the network representation of
social connections presented in Figure 10 reflects the actual
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positioning of the political parties. To be more precise, both
right-wing (PP and VOX) and left-wing (PSOE and UP)
parties appear to be closely connected, using the central party
(Cs) as a hub. Indeed, the Citizens party (CS) reports the
highest average degree and centrality values of the network.
Regarding the levels of activity of these accounts in Twitter,
perhaps the most noteworthy finding is the very clear associ-
ation between real-world events with peaks of activity of the
different parties; this association between bursts of activity
and media events have been further explored by previous
work [35]. Some of these events include the visit of Santiago
Abascal to the national TV show “El Hormiguero” associated
with a very high peak of activity of VOX, the riots in Catalonia
which are associated with activity peaks of both VOX and PP,
or the exhumation of the Spanish fascist dictator Francisco
Franco, with a high number of original tweets from PP, and
retweets in the case of VOX and UP. Then, on other events,
such as the main electoral debate and the elections’ day, the
political bots of all parties were highly active in terms of
interaction volumes. All of these represent key events where
political parties can emphasize their views in order to gain
votes, and thus this can explain the increased levels of activity
at those times. These differences in how the groups of bots of
each party have been orchestrated based on different events
might be indicative of centralized coordination behind the
scenes with clear political goals, perhaps in the form of botnets
that should be further studied.
Furthermore, the study also has some limitations that we
would like to acknowledge. The first one is that we are using
the external tool Botometer to detect these bots, and thus
our work can only be as trustworthy as this tool; however,
Botometer is widely considered as the best option in the
state of the art. Several decisions have been taken based on
statistical and empirical measures, and our decisions lie more
on the conservative side; therefore, we believe that the real
number of bots and influence is significantly higher than the
estimates that we report. Some uncertainty is common under
this kind of computational studies in social networks where
the ground truth is not directly observable.
Once again, we would like to highlight that the research
proposed in the paper at hand requires profound and critical
future works on the subject of opinion mining and Spanish lan-
guage processing. Moreover, despite having presented accurate
classification results, we sought after an in-depth analysis of
each social bot. To be precise, the highly filtered nature of the
collected data does not permit to gather general information
regarding the actual ideology showed by the accounts. Further
researches are also needed to pinpoint sarcasm and address
language-specific challenges.
Finally, we believe this line of work to be of high im-
portance, and the rationale is grounded on psychological re-
search on belief and behavior. Previous researches have shown
how social media might be changing the political beliefs of
citizens [36], and there have been researches attempting to
model how this belief influence might propagate across social
networks [37].
A number of theories have connected the beliefs and be-
havior of people, the latest one in [38] known as the “Rea-
soned action approach,” provides a framework that connects
beliefs, intentions, and behavior. Therefore, these social bots,
by importantly amplifying and propagating specific ideas,
can affect the belief of the social media users, thus directly
affecting their behavior when voting in political elections. It
remains a challenge how to effectively quantify this effect
on constituents, but we believe that controlled A/B experi-
ments with interventions that can include awareness messages,
surveys and focus groups, are promising directions to start
estimating its implications. The majority of social networks
including Twitter, currently are loose enough to allow certain
automatization. However, given the high-stakes that are at
play when these features are misused with ill objectives, we
consider vital to keep studying the potential effects of these
phenomena on our modern democracies.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has analyzed the presence and behavior of social
bots on Twitter in the 2019 Spanish general election scenario.
To summarize the article at hand, the analysis has been
performed by following a research methodology composed
of three main stages that encompass both supervised and
unsupervised learning, namely: data collection, data analysis,
and knowledge extraction. As a result, the proposed framework
presents capabilities such as human and social bots classifica-
tion, social bots’ political inclinations identification, and a hint
of social botnet discovering through friendship analysis.
A pool of experiments has demonstrated not only a non-
negligible number of social bots on Twitter participating in
the Spanish elections but also a relevant number of daily inter-
actions and traffic volume. Indeed, the analysis of behavioral
differences between humans and social bots have detected that
humans tend to retweet content shared by the social bots, while
social bots tend to retweet human contents to make it viral. Our
analysis also analyzed and reported quantitative measurements
of the social bots’ temporal appearance and relationships.
Last but not least, although the sentiment analysis reported
an overall negative trend—a common aspect in social media
nowadays—it also suggested essential differences between the
political parties.
As future work, we plan to extend the harvested dataset with
further interactions that would improve the performance of
the classifier algorithms, perhaps including OSINT metadata
regarding political actors. We also consider the revision of
the sentiment analysis process by adding new metrics and
improving the classification capabilities, which, to date, are
limited for the Spanish language. Future studies should test the
generalization of these findings, by applying similar method-
ologies to analyze other political election events in different
countries and social networks. Finally, we will investigate the
presence of potential botnets in the Spanish general election
scenario as well as measure their influence in human decisions
and the result of the election.
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